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Abstract: 
Aim: Good governance structures have become an issue of public interest, including public pension 
systems. The quality and performance of the trustees of the funds influences the income flows to which 
members are entitled and promised, as well as any shortfalls thereof that may require interventions. We 
aim to examine the pension fund governance in Tanzania, by focusing on structures and mechanisms of 
boards of trustees, as well as its perceived challenges and future directions. 
Design / Research methods: An extensive literature review provides the conceptual and practical 
framework for studying the pension funds governance on both a macro (regulatory) and a micro (board 
of trustees as a governing body) level. This case study describes the system in mainland Tanzania, 
where various regulators and five pension funds play a role.  
Conclusions / findings: Board of trustees are important for funds governance. The pension fund 
structure and mechanisms in Tanzania uphold high standards. However, a major issue is that the board 
selection seems to be politically motivated and that the government claims most board seats, making 
conflicts of interest likely to occur repeatedly.  
Originality / value of the article: The Tanzanian experience shows the importance of transparent 
mechanisms and structures, overseen by an independent and virtuous board of trustees. 
Implications of the research: Further works need to be considered to account for heterogeneity in 
pension systems especially in developing countries. 
Keywords: Public pension funds, structure and mechanisms, governance, Tanzania, board of trustees, 
case study 
JEL: G23, G34  
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1. Introduction, problem definition and objective 
 
 Public pension fund governance debates are top in both academic and public 
policy agenda worldwide. This is partly because the design and governance of 
pension funds has significant implications for the welfare of participants (Clark, 
Urwin 2010). In addressing fundamental pension fund governance challenges, 
Ambachtsheer et al. (2006: 15), along with a seminal survey, posed a few interesting 
questions: ‘‘what is the true economic value of good pension fund governance? (…) 
What are the best routes to address the weaknesses in pension fund governance 
(…)? Should government legislation/regulation play a pro-active role?” These 
questions and many others, provide a good basis for analysing pension funds 
governance as it has direct bearing on the interests of stakeholders (Clark 2004). 
Pension fund governance is a complex and wide topic which defies a straightforward 
categorization (Thornton, Fleming 2011). This is true because, in assessing pension 
fund governance, one could focus on the funds designs, processes and structure or 
funds’ investments performance (Rozanov 2015). 
 Governance in a pension funds’ perspective implies a framework that the 
governing bodies (directors or trustees) use in decisions making. The framework 
may include, among others, “the structure of the governing body (including legal 
basis and segregation of functions); the decision making processes within the 
governing body (including internal controls, risk management, compliance functions 
and internal oversight structures); the requisite skills and competencies of the 
governing body; and the means by which the governing body is accountable to 
stakeholders (principally plan members and beneficiaries, but also a wider 
stakeholder set including employers, supervisory board, supervisors, regulators and 
government)” (OECD/ISSA/IOPS 2008: 5). 
 As a result, good governance is an essential ingredient of any institution’s 
functional performance, which is the capacity of an organization to function in ways 
consistent with desired goals. Pension funds are subject to many governance 
problems like other modern corporations. These include substantial agency 
problems, since the beneficiaries (principals) trust their assets to be managed by 
trustees (agents), and at the same time the principals are unable to monitor the 
PUBLIC PENSION FUND STRUCTURE AND MECHANISMS … 
137 
actions of the agents. In such settings, pension funds governance differs from 
governance of corporations or other financial institutions. This is partly because 
corporate governance mechanisms and structures are mostly focused on the interests 
of shareholders, whereas pension fund governance is focused on a multiple set of 
stakeholders (beneficiaries, employers, and financial institutions) that will, in some 
instances, have interests quite different and sometimes opposed to the interests of 
shareholders or other owners of the governing body (Stewart, Yermo 2008; Clark, 
Urwin 2008; Ambachtsheer 2013). 
 To address potential pension funds governance problems, international agencies 
have issued regulations and guidelines for best pension governance practices. These 
international pension governance regulatory guidelines have only been provided 
recently (OECD 2009; ILO 2010; IOPS 2013; OECD 2015). The guidelines relate to 
governance structure and governance mechanisms. The governance structure covers 
issues such as responsibility identification, governing body, accountability, 
suitability, delegation and expert advice, auditor, actuary, custodian and the 
governance mechanisms part covers risk-based instruments, reporting and 
disclosure. Ashcroft et al. (2009) divide pension governance into four areas: 
independence, which requires clear clarifications of duties and responsibilities; 
accountability, which is partly about a fitting internal organisation; transparency, to 
ensure objectives are communicated to stakeholders and are understood; and lastly, 
integrity, which refer to having codes of conduct and applying them.  
 This article aims to examine the pension fund governance in Tanzania, by 
focussing on structures and mechanisms of boards of trustees, as well as its 
perceived challenges and future directions. The pension sector in Tanzania has 
witnessed substantial reforms in the last decades, such as the inception of a 
regulatory agency and introduction of private pension funds systems (SSRA 2015). 
With the introduction of a regulator, pension funds board of trustees are faced with 
new regulations and codes of conduct in performing their fiduciary duties. In 
particular, this article tries to answer the question “what are main governance 
structures and mechanisms present in Tanzanian pension funds board of trustees, 
using independence, accountability, transparency and integrity perspectives?” With 
this research question, we basically refer to the agency issues as singled out by the 
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survey of Ambachtsheer et al. (2006), whereas the governance effectiveness and 
investment/risk management issues that they stress are left to another article 
(Westerman, Chande 2016).  
 A comprehensive literature review provided the conceptual and practical 
framework for studying the pension funds governance on both a macro (regulatory) 
and a micro (board of trustees as a governing body) level. This study describes the 
pension funds governance systems in mainland Tanzania, in which various 
regulators and five pension funds play a role. It applies a case research approach 
whose findings suggest similarities and differences of views along the concepts 
applied. The discussion shows that there are improvements in pension funds 
governance on both the macro and micro aspects. Moreover, there are prevalent 
weaknesses and problems within the system that require attention. Board selection 
procedures should be depoliticised to smoothen the pension funds system. 
 The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section two has a literature 
review focusing on the regulatory structure, and the board of trustees’ structure and 
mechanisms with specific attention to independence, accountability, transparency 
and integrity issues. Section three covers the (case) research methodology adopted, 
while section four describes the results and discusses these. Our conclusion is drawn 
up in the last section.  
 
 
2. Literature overview 
 
2.1 Governance structure and mechanisms 
 The governance of public pension funds differs from one to another depending 
mostly on the legal form of the funds and may basically assume three types: 
institutional, contractual and trust-based legal form (Stewart, Yermo 2008; OECD 
2009). Under the institutional type, the pension fund is an independent entity with 
legal capacity and personality and has its internal governing board. Such 
arrangements can be found in most developed countries like Germany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Japan, Poland Italy and Denmark. Except for Germany and the 
Netherlands, which have dual-board structure, other countries have single governing 
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boards with representatives from both workers and employers. The contractual type 
is mostly seen in countries like Portugal, Mexico, Slovakia, Turkey and some in 
Italy and Poland. Under this system, pension funds are not independent entities with 
legal personality or capacity, but the governing bodies are separate entities; usually 
financial institutions such as insurance companies or banks. It is interesting to note 
that in most countries under the Anglo-Saxon rule, the pension models are neither 
contractual nor institutional (Stewart, Yermo 2008; OECD 2009). These countries 
follow a trust-based legal form whereby trustees have the legal title over pension 
funds’ assets. In these arrangements, trustees, whether appointed or elected, are 
expected to make decisions solely for beneficiaries’ interest. Trustees are not part of 
trust and could be of corporate type, as seen in United Kingdom, Australia or 
Ireland.  
 Despite increasing recognition over the importance of pension funds 
governance, challenges are still prevalent in both developed and developing 
countries. Most studies have found a positive link between governance and pension 
funds’ performance and thus lack of governance affects the pension industry 
globally. Ambachtsheer and McLaughlin (2015) found out that despite 
improvements in pension funds governance, compared to the earlier Ambachtsheer 
et al. (2006) study, various countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK 
and the USA still encounter many problems requiring attention. Mercer (2006) 
conducted a multinational survey on corporate pension governance: the author found 
out that most pension funds lack clear governance plans globally. These also 
included lack of skills and the competence of the governing bodies. Another report 
(OECD/ISSA/IOPS 2008) shows that transparency, information disclosure to 
beneficiaries; governing body competency and internal controls are still major 
governance problems in the countries studied. 
 In Ireland, a Pensions Board (2006) report shows that there is huge variation in 
awareness and understanding of trustees’ responsibilities and conflicts of interest 
among nominated trustees of defined benefit plans. Also, consistency in trustee 
decision-making is an issue with UK pension funds (Clark et al. 2007). Likewise, 
Clark (2007) found an increasing tension between representation and expertise in 
several UK pension funds. The findings suggest that most trustees lack the necessary 
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competence and skills to challenge experts’ opinions; therefore, continuing training 
was pointed to be vital in improving the situation. In general, poor performance in 
trust based-system is partly associated with weaknesses in governing boards, such as 
unclear defined duties and responsibilities, trustees being selected as representatives 
rather than for their knowledge, lack of self-assessments, and poor handling of 
conflicts of interest. 
 Furthermore, various empirical studies have found a positive relationship 
between board of trustees’ characteristics and pension fund performance. Jackowicz 
and Kowalewski (2012) found a direct relation between composition and motivation 
of the board members on Polish pension fund performance. Also, Ambachtsheer et 
al. (2006) found board competency and boards understanding of their roles as two 
fundamental challenges in pension governance. In their analysis, board competency 
is a complex issue since it depends on how trustees are brought in, either selected or 
elected. Competency in this regard does not imply trustees to become experts but 
rather being able to think strategically and govern the funds using defined standards. 
With respect to qualifications, the best practices recommend boards to have 
qualified and experienced individuals dedicated to protect members (PPF 2010, 
Mercer 2014). As a group the board should be composed of individuals with 
portfolios of skills in various areas that will allow it to exercise the fiduciary duties 
and make sound decisions on behalf of beneficiaries (Ambachtsheer, McLaughlin 
2015; Ronazov 2015). 
 As Stewart and Yermo (2008) report, very few pension funds require trustees to 
be experts or to have any financial or investment background. While best practice 
guidelines provide room for varied experiences and qualifications, they do list core 
competencies and qualifications that each trustee should possess. For instance, a 
trustee must have at least five years of management experience in financial or social 
security from any public or any reputable organization. Furthermore, studies 
continue to raise concerns over the politically appointed trustees, since politicians 
are likely to interfere in board’s decision making for political gains (Hess 2005; 
Yang, Mitchell 2005; Stewart, Yermo 2008; Fitzpatrick, Monahan 2015). One 
example of politically influenced decision may include investment of fund assets in 
the local economy or in certain ventures. In this regard, independent trustees (elected 
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by beneficiaries) are outsiders and thus are more likely to monitor members’ 
interests than politically selected trustees who are seen as insiders.  
 As to Fitzpatrick and Monahan (2015: 1321), “despite the structural problems 
inherent in public plan governance, comprehensive studies of the issue are lacking in 
both developed and developing countries”. Consequently, few studies on pension 
fund structures and mechanisms of board of trustees are found in Africa. Interesting 
is a document by Rusconi (2008) who found the most governance challenges in 
South African pension funds to be: knowledge gaps among trustees, conflicts of 
interests among consultants and assets managers, and weak board discipline. 
Njuguna (2011) found out that funds leadership and designs have positive impacts 
on governance in Kenya. As for Tanzania, one of the present authors stated a need 
for more body independence and transparency (Chande 2011). Okoye and Eze 
(2013) note that minimum standards in disclosing corporate governance practices 
should be applied and that practitioners should adhere and comply with the 
requirements on the new pension scheme in Nigeria. 
 
2.2 Background to the Tanzanian pension funds system  
 The theoretical foundation of most pension funds governance studies is based on 
the agency theory (Hess, Impavido 2003; Ambachtsheer, McLaughlin 2015). Partly, 
this is because potential governance structure and mechanism problems in pension 
funds are agency problems. The governing bodies are agents that work on behalf of 
beneficiaries who are principals. In this relationship, the agent may take actions that 
are not in favour of the principal. Consequently, “institutional performance is 
conditioned by the inherited practices of various bodies that are responsible for these 
funds” (Clark, Urwin 2008: 2). We will use agency theory and assess its 
applicability in studying pension funds governance in Tanzania. This section will 
briefly discuss potential agency problems in public pension funds and mechanism to 
deal with such problems. 
 Tanzania provides a relevant case study since it has undergone major reforms in 
the pension industry. In the last decades, the pension sector in Tanzania has 
witnessed substantial reforms, such as the inception of a regulator and the 
introduction of private pension funds systems. With the introduction of a regulator, 
Zubeda CHANDE MPINGA, Wim WESTERMAN  
142 
pension funds are faced with new regulations and codes of conduct in relation to 
good governance which emphasize positive returns. These new developments pose 
potential agency problems, since governing bodies are expected to adapt to the 
changes and produce optimal outcomes.  
 The pension schemes in Tanzania fall under the social security system (SSRA 
2015), of which the social assistance schemes fall outside of the scope of this study. 
The Mainland Tanzania pension fund system comprises of five funds, which are 
regulated by the Social Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA). The funds are 
categorized as social security funds since they offer more than pension benefits as 
stipulated in specific funds’ Acts. The benefits and eligibility criteria used to differ 
per fund (World Bank 2014). In general, all funds offer benefits such as old age 
pension, invalidity pension, survivors’ benefit, funeral benefits, social health 
insurance (only offered by one fund) and maternity benefit (provided by only two 
pension funds). Nonetheless, the current regulation has harmonised the benefit 
formula. 
 The system has both a mandatory and a voluntary tier, but the first tier clearly 
dominates. The mandatory tier is for all employees in public and private sectors, and 
is defined benefit, while the voluntary tier is for workers in the informal sectors and 
is under defined contribution (SSRA 2015). Moreover, the contribution rates vary 
depending on the sector. Nevertheless, the law requires members or employees to 
contribute a total of 20 percent (divided equally with the employers) or 5 percent 
from the employee and 15 percent paid by the employers. 
 Like most pension funds in sub-Saharan countries, pension funds started as 
provident funds and converted into pension or social security funds after 
independence (Dorfman 2015). The reforms were a step towards ensuring adequate 
income during retirement by paying monthly pensions to retirees than lump-sum as 
it was the case under provident systems. Additionally, all funds cover anyone who 
wants to join, including workers and employees in the public and private sector, 
NGOs, international agencies, workers and persons from informal sector, self-
employed, and other people working under non-pensionable basis. As stipulated in 
their respective Acts, a fund’s roles include registering of new members, collecting 
contributions, paying its members benefits, and investing prudently, as prescribed in 
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the law. To achieve their goals, all pension funds have a specific mission, vision and 
objectives which are all set in strategic plans which run into three to five years’ 
cycles. 
 The pension funds play a major role not only in the financial sector of the 
country but are a major source of income for retirees and their dependents. The 
sector comprises of five pension funds, which by 2013 had net assets that grew from 
TZS 5.3 trillion to TZS 6.5 trillion. According to a recent financial report, the total 
pension funds’ assets account for over 21 per cent of the financial system (BOT 
2015). The membership size grew from 1.95 million members in 2013/14 to 2.14 
million in 2014/15 (including National Health Insurance Fund members), reflecting 
a 10 per cent growth (SSRA 2015). Members’ contributions grew from TZS 1.98 
trillion to TZS 2.27 trillion by 2015. It is interesting to note that the benefits 
payments also grew for over 15 per cent from TZS 1.38 trillion in 2013/14 to TZS 
1.53 trillion in 2014/2015. The increase in benefits pay outs could mainly be 
explained by the short-term benefits which includes premature pension withdrawals 
and which calls for affirmative actions, as premature withdraws of pension may lead 
to inadequate pension during old age. 
 It is further shown that the social security sector is expected to continue 
improving in terms of performance and structure (BOT 2015). The sector has 
undergone several reforms since independence, and more reforms are underway. 
Main objectives of the reforms include: encouraging and facilitating introduction of 
private pension funds, establishing an effective regulatory and supervisory 
framework for private pension funds, developing proper risks management 
frameworks in pension funds, and instituting sound and best practices of corporate 
governance in pension funds. The pension funds in general face both inherited 
institutional designs and governance challenges. They are characterized with limited 
membership coverage at less than 6 per cent of the active labour force (BOT 2015). 
Mismanaging and redirecting of sources from pension, for instance, to pay short-
term benefits, poor services and poor information to members and political 
interference are pointed at here.  
 




 This study confines its discussion to structures and mechanisms of the mainland 
Tanzania pension fund governance system, with a focus on board of trustees’ issues 
as part of the governing organs. Table 1 below, provides an overview of the 
concepts to be applied in this study: positions of stakeholders, duties and 
responsibilities, competency and trainings, monitoring and reporting, compensation 
and incentives, information and communication, guidelines, charters and codes, and 
stakeholders’ conflicts of interest. Given the lack of studies on the topic (Fitzpatrick, 
Monahan 2015) and its complex nature (Yin 2014), we employ a basically 
descriptive case study framework that, on top of observations, documents and other 
materials, heavily relies upon interviews with various players in the system as 
shown in Table 2.  
 Prior to holding the above-mentioned formal interviews, an introduction letter 
was sent to relevant organizations, including ministries, the pension fund’s regulator 
and all five pension funds with background information about the study as well as a 
confidentiality assurance. Participants were selected based on the snowball sampling 
procedure. Upon interviewees’ consent, the interviews were audio recorded and 
subsequently transcribed. All the interviews lasted between one to two hours, using 
questions adopted in a protocol. However, a semi-structured interview approach was 
used to allow for flexibility and hence providing a richer data set for later analysis 
(Ghauri, Grønhaug 2005). The board of trustees’ functioning was narrowed to four 
areas providing insights into the board’s structure and mechanisms in terms of 
independence, accountability, transparency and integrity. In line with key academic 
and practical literature, these concepts were selected to reflect board experiences in 
relations to good governance in Tanzanian public pension funds. 
 The basics for the study were laid by the knowledge and observations of the 
corresponding author. The actual research started late 2013, with making up a 
protocol, such as generally advised by the literature (Flyvbjerg 2006; Bereton et al. 
2008; Ihantola, Kihn 2010; Yin 2014). It was followed by an in-depth literature 
review, which led to an array of concepts that boiled down into a lengthy 
questionnaire. As can be drawn from Table 2, half of the 18 interviews were held in 
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a two-week timeframe in February 2014. In this period, board members, regulatory 
officials and experts were interviewed by both authors, and various on-site 
observations were made, e.g. at a stakeholders’ conference of one of the funds. 
 
Table 1. Pension fund governance areas 
1. Independence: Positions of stakeholders; Duties and responsibilities 
2. Accountability: Competency and trainings; Monitoring and reporting 
3. Transparency: Compensation and incentives; Information and communication 
4. Integrity: Guidelines, charters, codes; Conflict of interest stakeholders 
Source: Authors compilation 
 
Table 2. List of transcribed sessions 
Mr. A, Director of Operations, Fund C (26/02/14) 
Dr. B, Associate Professor, Former Trustee Fund A (18/02/14) 
Focus Group Faculty of Insurance and Social Protection IFM (27/02/14) 
Ms. C, Director General, SSRA (24/02/14) 
Mr. D, Assistant Commissioner, Ministry X/Y/Z (26/02/14) 
Mr. E, Project Management Officer at the BOT (18/04/14) 
Dr. F, Director Employers Association, Trustee Fund D (Acting Chair) (19/02/14) 
Mr. G, Investment Director Fund D (05/06/14) 
Ms. H, Director of Operations Fund E (June 26, 2014) 
Mr. I, Director of Research, Actuarial & Policy Development, SSRA (24/02/14) 
Mr. J, Secretary General Workers Association and Trustee Fund A (19/02/14) 
Mr. K, Internal Auditor Fund E (26/06/14) 
Dr. L, Pension Fund Expert at IFM (27/02/14) 
Mr. M, Director General Fund B (24/02/14) 
Mr. N, Director Employers Association, Member SSRA Board (07/10/15) 
Mr. O, Chief Actuarial and Risk Manager Fund A (26/06/14) 
Mr. P, Permanent Secretary Ministry X/Y/Z (17/04/15)  
Mr. Q, Former Trustee, SSRA Board Member (24/03/15) 
Source: Authors compilation 
 
 Afterwards, a mid-term review learnt that the topics dealt with were very broad 
by nature and that basically two groups of topics came out as being focal. Whereas 
the former dealt with investment oversight and led to a separate article (Westerman, 
Chande 2016), the latter referred to board of trustees’ governance. This led to a 
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break-up of the original research framework into two about equal parts, whereby 
some macro (regulatory) and micro (pension fund level) issues were maintained for 
both studies but with different perspectives. The subsequent interviews (including 
even one with a secretary of state) were spread out over another one and half year, 
but were discontinued by the second half of 2015, when it was concluded that no 
material data could be acquired anymore.  
 Data matrices allowed for condensing data and findings (cf. Miles et al. 2013). 
The corresponding author did the first review and analysis of the interview reports 
and wrote a base draft of the article. Focus was laid on reliable and valid 
descriptions and discussions regarding the key theoretical concepts of independence, 
accountability, transparency and integrity. With this strategy, analytical 
generalisation (a fitting overview) rather than statistical generalisation (with exact 
numbers) was strived for as shown in Yin (2014). The other researcher checked the 
results description and discussion, while also suggesting changes and additions to 
the draft. In this way, the results section was objectified. Yet, the conclusions drawn 
may reflect personal preferences of the authors of course. Having said this, follow-
up peer reviews did help to strengthen the text’s academic quality.  
 Next to the subjectivity issue already addressed above, our methodology may 
suffer from other drawbacks. As an example, it may be that the interviewees do not 
speak up frankly. This is believed not be true, since differences of opinions were 
addressed freely. It was understood though, that actual identities of the interviewees 
would be confidential, which may go to the detriment of reporting precision. 
Additionally, the possibility that the authors might have missed an important issue 
by not asking on it is most unlikely, the corresponding author being a system 
insider. Nevertheless, if this has led to protecting the so-called innocent, then so be 
it. Furthermore, there is a general lack of up-to-date and complete public 
documentation. Lastly, the study object is a “moving target” with many 
improvements under way on various aspects, such as rules and regulations. While 
recognising this flaw, it is also understood that we did our best to standardise on 
conditions as of late 2015.  
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4. Results and discussion 
 
 This section has the condensed results from the formal and transcribed interview 
sessions. We show the results on order of the collapsed conceptual framework (see 
Table 1), which takes on the perspectives of independence, accountability, 
transparency and integrity. After the description, the results are evaluated and 
confronted with literature. 
 
4.1 Results overview  
 The division between micro (pension fund) and macro (regulation) level 
sessions was 9 to 9 (see Table 2). We held 3 sessions with trustees having employee, 
employer or government backgrounds, and 6 sessions with management team 
members, including a general director, operations managers, investment managers, 
risk managers and auditors. Also, 4 sessions were held with regulator 
representatives, 2 with ministry officials, other 2 with researchers and 1 session was 
with a central bank officer. All mainland Tanzanian funds are represented, with an 
emphasis on Fund A with 5 sessions. Generally, the interviewees had between 3 and 
12 years of experience in the field. 
 The five Mainland Tanzania pension funds are overseen by the Social Security 
Regulatory Authority (SSRA), which has a structure that basically resembles one of 
a regular pension fund. The mother ministries and the central bank also historically 
play a regulatory role. Day-to-day funds operations are run by the Management 
Team, which comprises of various directorates, departments and units. These 
include at Fund A the Directorate of Finance (DF), the Directorate of Operations 
(DO), the Directorate of Human Resources and Administration (DHRA), the 
Directorate of Internal Audit (DIA) and others, normally counting to a total of 
around 7. The five Tanzanian pension funds under study all have comparable setups. 
 Members’ interests are represented by board of trustees under a tripartite 
arrangement, which is employees, employers and government. In general, each 
organization nominates candidates and the mother ministry appoints trustees from a 
list. However, the Board’s chair is appointed by the president, as is the CEO 
(Director General, DG). In principle, a board member serves two terms, but the 
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terms may go up to four. Except for a union board representative and one investment 
director, all trustees and board members criticise this system, even with much 
support from the regulatory side. The Boards composition varies from eight 
representatives to twelve, representing the government, workers, employers, experts 
and the private sector. Nonetheless, there are few female representatives in the board 
of trustees.  
 All roles of board members and DGs are defined in the regulations, even before 
the regulator came into force. The board members for instance have signed a 
contract with mother Ministries which describes their duties and responsibilities. 
Similarly, each fund has other policies and regulations to support and guide in the 
execution of their duties. Furthermore, DGs serve as the secretary of the Board and 
are responsible for preparing all minutes and agendas. Yet, the interviewees disagree 
about whether this arrangement is right. All pension boards meet quarterly, but the 
chairman can call for an ad-hoc meeting in case of a pressing matter or issue. 
Committees meet more often and prepare for the board meetings. The SSRA DG is 
keen to note that after risks are reported to her, directors are personally liable from 
thereon. 
 Laws require the board of trustees to have the skills, knowledge and competency 
necessary to make pension funds related decisions. All pension funds acts, and the 
board of trustees’ code of conducts clearly stipulate who qualifies to be a board 
member. Some interviewees articulate doubts about the actual quality, especially of 
union representatives. Some funds have an annual training programme and board 
training is on a needs basis. Moreover, there is no formal skills gap analysis. The 
board trainings are done both locally and internationally; they also include study 
tours to other countries within Africa, Asia, Europe and America. One interviewee 
complains about at least one trip with a perk character. Staff trainings are done 
regularly, and several interviewees note that government officials should also be 
trained. The SSRA assumes a facilitating role on trainings, supported by the central 
bank and the ILO. 
 At the time of the interviews, board of trustees’ members are remunerated 
“handsomely”, as one of the interviewees’ notes. However, another interviewee 
states more prudently that the efforts made are compensated. One fund has a small 
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annual fee for board members, but sitting allowances for meetings and trainings 
prevail. Travelling and living costs are covered when being underway. However, 
one angry interviewee recalls a luxurious trip outside of the country that merely 
benefitted the board members personally. Notwithstanding this, it must be noted that 
the board members may also find themselves to “feel the heat” and they are 
personally liable when a fund goes under in the end. After most of the interviews 
had been held, the remuneration system became more lump sum with the funds. 
 Funds are required by law to keep proper records. Monitoring and reporting 
basically flows via the board committees and the internal systems. Board evaluations 
are being established. Formal evaluations are done on a yearly base and quarterly 
reports are made up as well. All funds adhere to a comprehensive framework act 
(2012) and use the government agencies reporting system OPRAS. The Regulator 
makes up a yearly overview of key results, with the Bank of Tanzania reporting on 
the investments. Internal auditing departments and external auditors regularly check 
the quality of the data provided. Next to physical inspections, the SSRA has had an 
actuarial review done twice and funds themselves do this at times. It is also said that 
controls assure compliance. 
 The findings from the interviews show that many internal documents are not for 
public consumption. However, all funds use different channels such as annual 
conferences, booklets, seminars and media to inform members about the Fund’s 
progress and status. In terms of communication to the public, the Fund uses media 
such as Radios, TVs, television programs and the annual general meetings. During 
the annual members meeting, the Fund gives the financial reports, shows the Fund’s 
progress and then discusses with members. In other instances, Funds hold seminars 
with employers. The central bank regularly reports on the funds’ investments. The 
SSRA informs the public and holds a yearly social security week. The flow of 
information and communication is getting way better quickly, but it is still said to be 
“poor”. The need to educate the public is high, but marketing goals are said to 
prevail. 
 In Tanzania, laws determine the boundaries for the pension fund system to 
operate in. Next to this, the regulators, increasingly represented by the SSRA, have 
set guidelines that the funds must adhere to. The funds themselves have their own 
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guidelines for behaviour, which are translated in missions, visions, policies, charters, 
codes and manuals. These are in use with a fund as a whole, boards and their 
committees, management teams and specific units. Funds may employ more than ten 
formal regulations, often referred to as charters or codes of conduct. Basically, they 
explain what is expected from a body and should prevent a fund from going under. 
Some interviewees call for visions for many years ahead, to adapt to changing 
needs. Despite the formal rules that may even boil down in fraud and whistle blower 
manuals, funds still face some issues, e.g. bribe of HR departments and corruption. 
 Multiple conflicts of interest may occur in the system due to some of the 
existing structure. The government as a guarantor sometimes interferes with 
financial decisions of funds, and the funds cannot object to such request. Too much 
political interference is a quite general complaint. However, in one fund, big 
projects cannot be vowed by special resolution. Also, whereas employer and 
employee representatives do not have fundamental conflicts of interest, board 
members do have occasionally. They are, by law, expected to declare these conflicts 
and regulations even prescribe that one can be expelled from the board after 
improvement attempts have failed. A specific issue is that pension funds cannot 
punish non-complying employers. 
 
4.2 Results discussion 
 The design of the board of trustees in all five mainland Tanzania pension funds 
does not vary considerably. In general, board of trustees come from mainly three 
groups: trustees who serve by virtue of their public office (i.e. a state treasurer who 
automatically serves on board), trustees appointed by an elected official (could be a 
president or a minister) and representatives elected by either employers or 
employees directly or through trade unions (Urwin 2010; Fitzpatrick, Monahan, 
2015). All boards range between eight and twelve members (SSRA 2015). This 
design in Tanzania is historically influenced, as in the past pension funds were 
sector based; in that case, the number of board members was determined by funds 
stakeholders. The boards guide the management teams, which in turn steer the daily 
activities in the fund. The SSRA as a kind of a “super fund”, assisted by the central 
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bank and reporting to the ministry of Labour, has a comparable structure. Next to the 
SSRA, the mother Ministries of the funds play a supervisory role. 
 In the broadest sense, a potential agency problem is likely to arise for political 
appointed board members due to political pressures. Indeed, most interviewees view 
body composition and selection to be problematic. This is partly because the 
selection process is done through representative organizations which do not have a 
standard selection format or procedure. In this case, trustees may make decisions in 
favour of the appointee. Our findings support this, since various pension funds have 
made investments that focus on social utility, for instance building a university or a 
bridge, without sufficient returns. This finding is consistent with Ambachtsheer et al. 
(2006), who found that composition and selection were sub-optimal with most 
boards surveyed. The selection process reported to be haphazard and jeopardize 
trustee’s independence. In ideal pension governance settings, board members who 
are not appointed but selected possess strong numeric skills and the ability to think 
logically within a probability-based domain; such skills enable the board to function 
effectively in its long-horizon mission (Urwin 2010).  
 Most trustees are serving for more than two terms; the law set a two-term tenure, 
which is, however, renewable. In terms of good governance, perhaps it would be 
important in the future to assess the value added of having a board member for 
twelve years. In terms of gender representation, adjustments could be made since 
there are fewer number of female trustees than one might expect. Since the 
government has clearly shown intention in increasing female numbers in various 
boards, special attention may be taken in the pension sector. Another issue that some 
interviewees take on board is that the DG acts as a board secretary. Obviously, 
paternalism lies right around the corner then, but this practice also has informational 
advantages. Unfortunately, public data on board composition are incomplete. 
 Having noted the above, improvements in terms of trustees and other staff 
trainings is generally observed throughout the system. Yet, a training need for 
government officials and politicians is recognised, and a remark on the perk 
character of some training is made. Indeed, all interviewees who refer to the issue 
signal a positive tendency in this respect. This is partly due to the requirement set by 
the regulator that needs funds to periodically train their trustees and staff in general 
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to meet the changing pension issues. Competent and skilled boards of trustees 
enhance the funds decision-making processes and ensure that beneficiaries get the 
maximum value for their contributions (Clark 2007). In this regard, improvements in 
board selections such as via self-application may yield more competent trustees than 
the current system. 
 Our survey evidence further shows that, all pension funds conduct a self-
performance assessment at least on an annual basis. However, none of the funds has 
used or is using external assessment. This finding is consistent with Mercer (2014), 
where 42 percent of the funds surveyed conduct self-assessment evaluation. 
According to the report, the results implies that opting for self-assessment is more 
for compliance rather than a genuine attempt of boards to discover if they are 
performing optimally. Through self-assessment, board members rate themselves 
highly and thus are not judging objectively. However, there are occasional examples 
of critical internal board evaluations in Tanzania. Also, the annual SSRA review 
may be viewed to partly fill in the gap noticed in this respect. However, the critical 
issue is to ensure evaluation findings are properly communicated to relevant 
stakeholders and are made public for accountability purposes. 
 Furthermore, in a member-centric governance system, communication should 
ideally be personalized, targeted and single topic, and adapted to different segments 
of the population in terms of circumstances, attitudes, and financial knowledge. 
Despite improvements in many communication aspects, our findings suggest poor 
communication between funds and members. All funds use advanced technology for 
informing members about their financial status; however, not all members are 
technologically savvy to be able to access, for instance, mobile technology. 
Likewise, there is no system or practice of sending members statements. This could 
help in informing member’s progress and getting a snap overview of the expected 
pensions, which could in turn assist them to financially plan their retirement income. 
 Moreover, the current study found that the problem in Tanzania is not lack of 
rules or regulations, which are multiple and well-known, but rather compliance and 
reinforcement of such regulations. Outright fraud is rarely reported, but irregularities 
are all around, it seems. The same counts for conflicts of interest, which must be 
declared, but seldom are reported. However, the board of trustees under current 
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institutional arrangements are political representatives by nature, with more than 
half of the board embers being government representatives anyway, which will have 
greater influence on their decision-making independence. This is consistent with the 
agency theory, which posits that political appointed trustees are potentially exposed 
to political pressure. For instance, Hess (2005) reported a positive impact of 
appointed trustees on investment returns. Yet, the presence of governmental 
representatives in boards is necessary to the Tanzanian system.  
 Furthermore, in line with Rozanov (2015), the interviews revealed board 
selection as a key issue of successful board governance. The current selection 
procedure for board members seems to be politicised. The system could benefit from 
adopting or adjusting the current selection or board appointment and enhance its 
independence. The sector regulator is called to ensure that the issued regulations are 
translated into actual selection processes by introducing board entry assessment of 
some form. This may help in selecting competent trustees who could easily be 
trained to attain required skills in performing their duties. If merging the existing 
funds will become definite, thus forming one large public and one private pension 
fund, board of trustee’s appointments will become even more prominent. If private 
pension funds arrangements may also mean the introduction of a defined 
contribution system, a different approach of governance is moreover required.  
 It seems obvious how to choose if we are presented with the following 
scenarios. “Imagine two pension funds, each with a board of governors. The board 
of Fund #1 has been carefully selected based on a template that sets out optimal 
board composition in terms of the relevant collective skill/experience set, positive 
behavioural characteristics, and an un-conflicted passion for the well-being of the 
pension fund organization and its stakeholders. The board of Fund #2 was randomly 
selected out of the telephone book. Which of these two boards do you think would 
get higher oversight rankings for such important tasks as CEO selection and 
evaluation, clear delegation of authority to management, and self-evaluation of 
board effectiveness? Which of these two funds will likely generate better 
organization performance over the long term?” (Ambachtsheer 2006: 12). Our 
answer would likely be Board #1 and Fund #1, but the author cautions that the 
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difficulty of proving our answer would be in the metrics representing governance 





 As Urwin (2010) pointed out, pension funds should start to treat governance as a 
variable and not a constraint, and make some moves in the direction of best practice. 
Our findings suggest in the same line of reasoning that considerable improvements 
of Tanzanian pension fund governance are present; however, some aspects of 
governance need adjustments. In terms of board composition, the current mix 
provides a multitude of competencies and experiences; still, more qualified expert 
candidates need to be included in the boards. These could include experts with some 
basic and substantive knowledge in actuarial studies, social security, and financial 
management in general. Such skills together with others like human resources and 
management could improve the boards’ collective ability to make prudent decisions. 
Such skills further assist trustees to be able to delegate decision making to 
competent technical experts. 
 Each pension fund has a mission and governance mechanisms by which to 
achieve its objectives. The most important aspect is to align the funds’ governance 
structure and how the funds are managed daily. As Ambachtsheer (2011: 27) stated, 
“clear linkages between mission, governance, management and results are the 
hallmarks of pension funds management”. And if such elements are well integrated 
they can facilitate the conversion of retirement savings into pension payments in an 
efficient, cost-effective manner. Also, a faster turnover of trustees and having more 
females in the board might help to keep up the drive in an environment that is 
supposed to be rapidly changing. 
 Boards’ competence and skills is vital. The SSRA, perhaps working with 
experts, could develop competency and skills matrix as a strategy to select proper 
trustees in the boards. The matrix could help identifying the skill gaps and offer 
proper trainings. Moreover, the rising complexity in pension funds calls for more 
focus on governance issues; for example, the rising demands on the competency of 
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the governing body especially in developing countries where pension industry is at 
infant stages and growing rapidly. These countries may need to adjust and adapt new 
legislative requirements and increase supervisory competency on oversight of 
pension funds. 
 Monitoring and reporting in the Tanzanian pension fund system upholds high 
standards. In terms of board evaluation, evidence shows that pension funds use self-
assessments as a method of evaluation annually. Additionally, regulators play a role 
as countervailing powers in this respect. However, the pension funds need to move 
beyond a compliance-based system to objective performance assessment to discover 
whether trustees are performing optimally. Objective assessment could determine 
boards’ effectiveness thus help to devise strategies to improve funds’ performance 
as well as incorporating benchmarks for measuring the following evaluation. 
 In Tanzania, much has been done to guide the funds’ activities with guidelines, 
charters and codes that translate well into policies and manuals. Despite these 
efforts, the system occasionally gives way to corruption and may therefore call for 
reforms. Moreover, the actual performance has not always kept up to pace, in that 
governmental bodies are interfering much in the daily business of the funds. The 
cause of the interference could be attributed to the fact that the governmental is the 
lender of last resort, thus well understandable. However, since the pension funds 
have their own role in the society, namely to serve their members’ interests, these 
kinds of interruptions should be evaded as much as possible. In doing so, the boards 
of trustees of the pension funds can uphold their independence, accountability, 
transparency and integrity.  
 In conclusion, ‘governance’ has become a buzzword in both academia and 
pension industry. This is not only confined into private pension arrangements but 
also in public pension. The increasing attention of governance issues under public 
pension funds is due to the dynamic nature of pension funds’ operations and 
functions. The debates range from what is pension funds’ governance to how best to 
ensure good governance in pension funds. Fundamental questions are first, how 
should and can governing bodies ensure good governance in pension funds without 
jeopardizing the interests of beneficiaries, and second, how best should the board of 
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trustees govern. Hence, understanding their functions, structures, mechanisms and 
challenges are equally important for both beneficiaries and the economy at large. 
 However, it is important to note that measuring the effectiveness of public 
pension governance is difficult, since it is hard to determine the counter-factual 
(what did not happen or went wrong) or separate the effects of external variables. 
Yet, various bodies and academic researchers are continuing to devise and develop a 
range of performance measures. As the Tanzanian experience learns, this should be 
embedded in transparent mechanisms and structures, overseen by an independent 
and virtuous board of trustees. Having said this, further works need to be considered 
to account for heterogeneity in pension systems especially in developing countries. 
We call for continuing evaluations to feed on going and arising debates and hence 
propose best reform options. Pension fund’s governance is a dynamic phenomenon 
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Struktura i mechanizmy publicznych funduszy emerytalnych: studium 




Cel: Struktury dobrego współrządzenia, w tym też publiczne systemy emerytalne stały się 
przedmiotem zainteresowania publicznego. Jakość i kondycja powierników funduszy wpływa na 
przepływy dochodów, do których członkowie są utytułowani i które są im przyrzeczone, a także na 
jakiekolwiek niedobory z tego tytułu, które mogą wymagać interwencji. Autorzy mają na celu zbadanie 
współrządzenia funduszami emerytalnymi w Tanzanii poprzez skupienie się na strukturach i 
mechanizmach rad powierniczych, jak również na ich postrzeganych wyzwaniach i przyszłych 
kierunkach. 
 
Układ / metody badawcze: Dogłębny przegląd literatury przedmiotu pozwolił na sformułowanie 
koncepcyjnych i praktycznych ram dla badań nad współrządzeniem funduszami emerytalnymi zarówno 
na poziomie makro (regulacyjnym), jak i mikro (rada powiernicza jako ciało rządzące). Studium 
przypadku opisuje system w kontynentalnej Tanzanii, w której funkcjonują różne ciała nadzorujące 
oraz pięć funduszy emerytalnych. 
 
Wnioski / wyniki: Rada powierników jest ważna dla współrządzenia funduszami. Struktura i 
mechanizmy funduszy emerytalnych w Tanzanii spełniają wysokie standardy. Jednakże główną 
kwestię stanowi to, że wybór rady zdaje się być umotywowany politycznie i że rząd domaga się 
większości miejsc w radzie, co sprzyja powtarzalności występowania konfliktu interesów.  
 
Oryginalność / wartość artykułu: Tanzańskie doświadczenia wskazują na znaczenie przejrzystości 
mechanizmów i struktur, nadzorowanych przez niezależną i praworządną radę powierniczą. 
 
Implikacje badań: Należy rozważyć dalsze badania nad heterogenicznością w systemach 
emerytalnych, zwłaszcza w krajach rozwijających się. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: publiczne systemy emerytalne, struktura i mechanizmy, współrządzenie, Tanzania, 
rada powiernicza, studium przypadku 
JEL: G23, G34  
 
 
